Recently a panel discussion was made on “Strategies for dealing with Regions in Crisis: Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine-Lebanon, and Africa” and the observations made on the issue of Afghanistan were worth noting. The present situation in Afghanistan and the frontier regions of Pakistan is the accumulated result of developments since December 1979. The process of radicalisation in the region was the outcome of a series of strategic mistakes, including the use of Islamic extremists in the war against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
After 9/11, when the US intervened in Afghanistan, Pakistan had advised against using the Northern Alliance (which was largely a non-Pashtun coalition) to oust the Taliban regime from power. Pakistan’s advice was not heeded. In October 2001, the Taliban dispersed from Kabul to the south and east, back to their home areas. They were not militarily eliminated or defeated.
The south and east of Afghanistan lay mostly dormant and neglected until 2003. It was only after the physical ingress of NATO into the region that the insurgency seriously commenced. Between 2003-2006, the insurgency became organised in five command countries led among others by Mullah Omer, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mullah Dadullah and Gulbadin Hikmatyar.
The spread and intensity of the insurgency was the result of several factors i.e. (a) natural (Pashtun) local sympathy for the largely Pashtun Taliban; (b) further alienation of the Pashtun tribal leaders due to indiscriminate bombing and military tactics resulting in civilian casualties; political exclusion, specially after parliamentary elections; Tajik and non-Pushtuns control of the Afghan National Army (less now); (c) disenchantment of common people/villages due to counterinsurgency tactics; absence of development; corruption and injustice, especially at local level; selective destruction of poppy crops; and growing insecurity (caught in the cross-fire).
Cross-border support from FATA to the insurgency (mainly recruits, rest and regrouping was only a partial and arbitrary cause for the insurgency. Its major location and motivation was and remains within Afghanistan. Pakistan has taken several measures to check cross-border infiltration (1,000 check posts, over 100 military operations in FATA, capture or killing of 2000 al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders/commanders etc). While there was considerable impact of these measures on cross-border movement, the security environment in FATA, and neighbouring ‘settled areas’ deteriorated sharply. In 2007, al-Qaeda and some Taliban-linked groups turned on Pakistan and its security forces. There were a larger number of suicide bombings in Pakistan than Afghanistan in 2007 with 2000 civilian casualties. The main result was growing popular alienation with the ‘forward strategy’ in FATA. Paradoxically, within the FATA and the NWFP, there was also popular disenchantment with Islamic militancy. The February 18 elections led to success of the secular, Pashtun candidates of the ANP even in FATA.
The new government is committed to adopting a new strategy to end suicide bombings, pacify FATA, halt the spread of Taliban and militant influence, while continuing to cooperate and support the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Negotiations to halt the violence have been opened at several levels. The cause of violence in each of the FATA agencies is different. In the Swat district, the underlying cause was land-disputes and demand for speedy justice. The most critical negotiations relate to South Waziristan, where Baitullah Mehsud and the ‘Pakistani Taliban’ are located.
The concept of these peace deals is collective responsibility on the tribes for the maintenance of law and order in their areas. Of course, the tribal leaders have to bring in the insurgents active in their area into these peace agreements. The effect and implementation of these agreements will be slow. No doubt, there will be periodic reversals. The strategy is comprehensive with military, political and economic elements. The local militias, specially the FC will need to be strengthened and equipped to assume larger security functions. The Pakistan Army will be located in identified positions and posts and respond to security threats as and when required.
The widespread assertions that the peace talks with FATA tribes and militants have led to an increase in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan is at best premature. The rising incidents in Afghanistan are mostly at a distance from the border. Anyway, fighting always escalates during the spring/summer. In response to these concerns, specific clauses are being added to the agreements, specially within South Waziristan, committing the tribes to prevent cross-border attacks and surrender or expel al-Qaeda elements and other foreigners.
While there have been some well-publicised complaints from coalition commanders about rise in cross-border attacks, Pakistan too has many reasons for complaint. At the operational level Pakistan confronts (a) insufficient check-posts and troops on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has established 1200 check-posts; there are less than 100 on the other side; (b) inadequate real time intelligence sharing by the coalition and Afghan government; (c) coalition and Afghan National Army incursions into Pakistan territory; (d) non-supply of equipment requested by Pakistan for counterinsurgency purposes (night vision, UAVs, electronic surveillance, helicopters); (e) inflow into Pakistan (FATA) of foreign fighters - Uzbeks, Chechens etc - from and through Afghanistan; (f) attacks on Pakistan territory, specially artillery and aerial attacks (without warning or coordination), most seriously, the recent attack on Pakistani check-posts killing 12 Pakistani soldiers.
At the political level also, Pakistan faces several problems with the Afghan government and, at times, with coalition partners; including (a) non-recognition of the border by Kabul. (If there is no border, how can there be “cross-border”?); (b) opposition to border control measures e.g. fencing of parts of the border, distinction of biometric ID cards to check 40,000 daily legal crossings; (c) reluctance or refusal to relocate Afghan refugee camps close to the border to the other side, (as an effective means of reducing the cross-border problem and allegations regarding “safe havens” in Pakistan); (d) the presence of Indian Consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad involved in activities negatively affecting Pakistan’s security and stability; (e) provocative statements by Afghan leaders and officials blaming Pakistan for all of Afghanistan’s security problems, including the recent atrocious threat from Karzai to intervene in Pakistan territory; and (f) threats mainly from US legislators to cut off “assistance” to Pakistan and unjustified delays in reimbursements.
Pak-US cooperation is currently under strain. The political and operational challenges being confronted in the campaign to eliminate terrorism and to stabilise Afghanistan need to be addressed urgently through a strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the US. The US-NATO also need to review their strategic objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan and to redefine “success”. They will not be able to transform Afghanistan overnight into a modern democracy; not be able to change the conservative Islamic ideology and beliefs of the people of Afghanistan; and they will not be able to eliminate or ignore the major power components in Afghanistan, specially the Pashtun tribes. The new strategy will need to be truly comprehensive, including political, economic and military components.
The political strategy should aim at reconciliation. It should be designed to (a) isolate the violent extremists from the moderate or non-violent or non-involved majority; (b) win hearts and minds, through practical assistance (health, food, housing, agricultural support); (c) build peace from the grass roots, district by district, village by village; (d) utilise traditional modalities for dispute-settlement and accommodation (e.g. jirga system).
The economic strategy should utilise the “power of finance” to win the cooperation of tribal and local leaders; implement urgently needed locally-required reconstruction and job creation projects as the priority; improve transport and communications; encourage local entrepreneurship; find a viable solution to the poppy problem (e.g. buy up the crop of small farmers).
The military component should remain the option of last, not first, resort. While the larger presence of coalition forces may be required in the short-term, given the Afghan antipathy to foreigners, these should be progressively replaced with strengthened elements from the Afghan National Army and especially local militias. The major military targets should be the al-Qaeda terrorists, hard-core militants and criminal elements; not part-time (Taliban) fighters.
None of the components of the strategy will work unless governance and the system of justice is improved throughout Afghanistan
After 9/11, when the US intervened in Afghanistan, Pakistan had advised against using the Northern Alliance (which was largely a non-Pashtun coalition) to oust the Taliban regime from power. Pakistan’s advice was not heeded. In October 2001, the Taliban dispersed from Kabul to the south and east, back to their home areas. They were not militarily eliminated or defeated.
The south and east of Afghanistan lay mostly dormant and neglected until 2003. It was only after the physical ingress of NATO into the region that the insurgency seriously commenced. Between 2003-2006, the insurgency became organised in five command countries led among others by Mullah Omer, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mullah Dadullah and Gulbadin Hikmatyar.
The spread and intensity of the insurgency was the result of several factors i.e. (a) natural (Pashtun) local sympathy for the largely Pashtun Taliban; (b) further alienation of the Pashtun tribal leaders due to indiscriminate bombing and military tactics resulting in civilian casualties; political exclusion, specially after parliamentary elections; Tajik and non-Pushtuns control of the Afghan National Army (less now); (c) disenchantment of common people/villages due to counterinsurgency tactics; absence of development; corruption and injustice, especially at local level; selective destruction of poppy crops; and growing insecurity (caught in the cross-fire).
Cross-border support from FATA to the insurgency (mainly recruits, rest and regrouping was only a partial and arbitrary cause for the insurgency. Its major location and motivation was and remains within Afghanistan. Pakistan has taken several measures to check cross-border infiltration (1,000 check posts, over 100 military operations in FATA, capture or killing of 2000 al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders/commanders etc). While there was considerable impact of these measures on cross-border movement, the security environment in FATA, and neighbouring ‘settled areas’ deteriorated sharply. In 2007, al-Qaeda and some Taliban-linked groups turned on Pakistan and its security forces. There were a larger number of suicide bombings in Pakistan than Afghanistan in 2007 with 2000 civilian casualties. The main result was growing popular alienation with the ‘forward strategy’ in FATA. Paradoxically, within the FATA and the NWFP, there was also popular disenchantment with Islamic militancy. The February 18 elections led to success of the secular, Pashtun candidates of the ANP even in FATA.
The new government is committed to adopting a new strategy to end suicide bombings, pacify FATA, halt the spread of Taliban and militant influence, while continuing to cooperate and support the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Negotiations to halt the violence have been opened at several levels. The cause of violence in each of the FATA agencies is different. In the Swat district, the underlying cause was land-disputes and demand for speedy justice. The most critical negotiations relate to South Waziristan, where Baitullah Mehsud and the ‘Pakistani Taliban’ are located.
The concept of these peace deals is collective responsibility on the tribes for the maintenance of law and order in their areas. Of course, the tribal leaders have to bring in the insurgents active in their area into these peace agreements. The effect and implementation of these agreements will be slow. No doubt, there will be periodic reversals. The strategy is comprehensive with military, political and economic elements. The local militias, specially the FC will need to be strengthened and equipped to assume larger security functions. The Pakistan Army will be located in identified positions and posts and respond to security threats as and when required.
The widespread assertions that the peace talks with FATA tribes and militants have led to an increase in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan is at best premature. The rising incidents in Afghanistan are mostly at a distance from the border. Anyway, fighting always escalates during the spring/summer. In response to these concerns, specific clauses are being added to the agreements, specially within South Waziristan, committing the tribes to prevent cross-border attacks and surrender or expel al-Qaeda elements and other foreigners.
While there have been some well-publicised complaints from coalition commanders about rise in cross-border attacks, Pakistan too has many reasons for complaint. At the operational level Pakistan confronts (a) insufficient check-posts and troops on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has established 1200 check-posts; there are less than 100 on the other side; (b) inadequate real time intelligence sharing by the coalition and Afghan government; (c) coalition and Afghan National Army incursions into Pakistan territory; (d) non-supply of equipment requested by Pakistan for counterinsurgency purposes (night vision, UAVs, electronic surveillance, helicopters); (e) inflow into Pakistan (FATA) of foreign fighters - Uzbeks, Chechens etc - from and through Afghanistan; (f) attacks on Pakistan territory, specially artillery and aerial attacks (without warning or coordination), most seriously, the recent attack on Pakistani check-posts killing 12 Pakistani soldiers.
At the political level also, Pakistan faces several problems with the Afghan government and, at times, with coalition partners; including (a) non-recognition of the border by Kabul. (If there is no border, how can there be “cross-border”?); (b) opposition to border control measures e.g. fencing of parts of the border, distinction of biometric ID cards to check 40,000 daily legal crossings; (c) reluctance or refusal to relocate Afghan refugee camps close to the border to the other side, (as an effective means of reducing the cross-border problem and allegations regarding “safe havens” in Pakistan); (d) the presence of Indian Consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad involved in activities negatively affecting Pakistan’s security and stability; (e) provocative statements by Afghan leaders and officials blaming Pakistan for all of Afghanistan’s security problems, including the recent atrocious threat from Karzai to intervene in Pakistan territory; and (f) threats mainly from US legislators to cut off “assistance” to Pakistan and unjustified delays in reimbursements.
Pak-US cooperation is currently under strain. The political and operational challenges being confronted in the campaign to eliminate terrorism and to stabilise Afghanistan need to be addressed urgently through a strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the US. The US-NATO also need to review their strategic objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan and to redefine “success”. They will not be able to transform Afghanistan overnight into a modern democracy; not be able to change the conservative Islamic ideology and beliefs of the people of Afghanistan; and they will not be able to eliminate or ignore the major power components in Afghanistan, specially the Pashtun tribes. The new strategy will need to be truly comprehensive, including political, economic and military components.
The political strategy should aim at reconciliation. It should be designed to (a) isolate the violent extremists from the moderate or non-violent or non-involved majority; (b) win hearts and minds, through practical assistance (health, food, housing, agricultural support); (c) build peace from the grass roots, district by district, village by village; (d) utilise traditional modalities for dispute-settlement and accommodation (e.g. jirga system).
The economic strategy should utilise the “power of finance” to win the cooperation of tribal and local leaders; implement urgently needed locally-required reconstruction and job creation projects as the priority; improve transport and communications; encourage local entrepreneurship; find a viable solution to the poppy problem (e.g. buy up the crop of small farmers).
The military component should remain the option of last, not first, resort. While the larger presence of coalition forces may be required in the short-term, given the Afghan antipathy to foreigners, these should be progressively replaced with strengthened elements from the Afghan National Army and especially local militias. The major military targets should be the al-Qaeda terrorists, hard-core militants and criminal elements; not part-time (Taliban) fighters.
None of the components of the strategy will work unless governance and the system of justice is improved throughout Afghanistan
1 comment:
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