WITHOUT any doubt, Pakistan is passing through the worst of times in its turbulent history. Could these be turned into the best of times? It could happen but would require a great deal of work.
To begin with, such a goal would need a dedicated leadership that understands what is wrong with the Pakistani state and how it has reached the current stage. It will also need the more affluent segments of Pakistani citizenry to make sacrifices in order to obtain a better future for the coming generations and to help the less fortunate segments of the population.
There is a need for Pakistani leaders and citizens to appreciate that they live in a geographic space that is about the most troubled in the world. Pakistan has been designated as the world’s most dangerous place on earth, one that requires the immediate attention of the West under the leadership of the newly installed US president. One of the first acts of the new American president was to appoint Richard Holbrooke, a seasoned diplomat who honed his negotiating skills by getting the leaders of the disintegrating state of Yugoslavia to agree to what is known as the Dayton Accord. Holbrooke would do well to delve into the histories of the two countries for which he has been commissioned to develop a new American policy.
Why is Pakistan in such a precarious state at this time? There are many reasons for this. Of these three are particularly important. The first is the inability to develop a durable system of governance by laying the institutional foundation on which the structure of the state could be built. Second is the inability to come to terms with the structural problems that keep the economy excessively dependent on foreign largesse. Third is the absence of a foreign policy that could factor in the opportunities available to the country because of its location and not on the basis of fear of some immediate neighbours.
Leaders belonging to various Pakistani generations were so consumed with their quarrels that they did not turn their attention to the building of institutions. India, on the other hand, had the luxury of being led without interruptions of the kind for 17 years. Jawaharlal Nehru’s long rule resulted in the adoption of the constitution that provided a reasonable amount of security to most segments of the population and ensured respect for the constitution once he was no longer there.
That did not happen in Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah died a little more than a year after the birth of the Pakistani nation. Liaquat Ali Khan, his successor, belonged to a social group (migrants from India) that was a small minority in the population. He was assassinated, perhaps the target of a conspiracy that involved those wishing to wrest power from him. There was open political season after Liaquat’s murder during which the East Pakistanis fought the West Pakistanis and the West Pakistanis quarrelled among themselves. When the country did get its constitution – the first of three – it was politically too distracted to make it work. That gave space to the military to intervene.
During Gen Ayub Khan’s 11-year rule, the country saw not only political stability but also impressive economic growth. The general gave the country its second constitution, established a system of local government that brought people closer to those who governed, and established a system of economic decision-making that eschewed personal whims in favour of conformity with well-articulated strategies. For several years, in economic circles as well as among political scientists, Pakistan was considered a model of success. But the success proved to be short-lived.
Ayub Khan’s model collapsed for one important reason that also explained the failure of subsequent attempts to bring political and economic development to the country. Ayub Khan’s model was based on the faulty assumption that since the leader is all-knowing he can afford to keep the people at bay. His system of basic democracies enfranchised people at the local level, gave them some say in using public money for meeting their needs. But that is as far as their participation in the affairs of the state went. That was not far enough. People rebelled with two consequences: the separation of East Pakistan and the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the first elected ruler of the country.
But Pakistan’s leaders have never missed the opportunity to miss an opportunity. Bhutto had the popular support to give the country a durable political structure and to place the economy on the trajectory of long-term growth. After some initial success, he failed on both counts. His success was in giving the country a constitution that had the support of the people. The political failure was once again the consequence of the belief in an all-knowing patriarch guiding the affairs of the state without much participation from other representatives of the people.
The economic failure was the result of a strong belief in a discredited theory of management: that the best way of delivering benefits of growth to less privileged segments of society was to put the state on the commanding heights of the economy. There was much dissatisfaction among the people with Bhutto’s economic and political management which once again provided space for the military to occupy.
Another 11 years of military rule followed, by far the most destructive period in Pakistan’s history. Ziaul Haq went on to destroy the few political and economic institutions the country was left with. He disfigured the constitution to establish an all-powerful presidency within a parliamentary framework. The inherent tension in this approach could not be reconciled. The most ill-advised move by the religiously inclined military leader was to impose on the country a version of Islam that was foreign to it. His move in that direction, unfortunately, had the support of the United States which wanted jihadis for its mission to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.
The jihadis succeeded and Zia was briefly hailed in the West as the great liberator. But he left an ugly legacy for which the entire world, not only Pakistan, is paying a very heavy price. To understand how this legacy is manifesting itself, we need not go beyond what is happening in Swat today. That is the legacy that current civilian rulers of Pakistan – and now President Barack Obama and his special emissary – must contend with.
To begin with, such a goal would need a dedicated leadership that understands what is wrong with the Pakistani state and how it has reached the current stage. It will also need the more affluent segments of Pakistani citizenry to make sacrifices in order to obtain a better future for the coming generations and to help the less fortunate segments of the population.
There is a need for Pakistani leaders and citizens to appreciate that they live in a geographic space that is about the most troubled in the world. Pakistan has been designated as the world’s most dangerous place on earth, one that requires the immediate attention of the West under the leadership of the newly installed US president. One of the first acts of the new American president was to appoint Richard Holbrooke, a seasoned diplomat who honed his negotiating skills by getting the leaders of the disintegrating state of Yugoslavia to agree to what is known as the Dayton Accord. Holbrooke would do well to delve into the histories of the two countries for which he has been commissioned to develop a new American policy.
Why is Pakistan in such a precarious state at this time? There are many reasons for this. Of these three are particularly important. The first is the inability to develop a durable system of governance by laying the institutional foundation on which the structure of the state could be built. Second is the inability to come to terms with the structural problems that keep the economy excessively dependent on foreign largesse. Third is the absence of a foreign policy that could factor in the opportunities available to the country because of its location and not on the basis of fear of some immediate neighbours.
Leaders belonging to various Pakistani generations were so consumed with their quarrels that they did not turn their attention to the building of institutions. India, on the other hand, had the luxury of being led without interruptions of the kind for 17 years. Jawaharlal Nehru’s long rule resulted in the adoption of the constitution that provided a reasonable amount of security to most segments of the population and ensured respect for the constitution once he was no longer there.
That did not happen in Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah died a little more than a year after the birth of the Pakistani nation. Liaquat Ali Khan, his successor, belonged to a social group (migrants from India) that was a small minority in the population. He was assassinated, perhaps the target of a conspiracy that involved those wishing to wrest power from him. There was open political season after Liaquat’s murder during which the East Pakistanis fought the West Pakistanis and the West Pakistanis quarrelled among themselves. When the country did get its constitution – the first of three – it was politically too distracted to make it work. That gave space to the military to intervene.
During Gen Ayub Khan’s 11-year rule, the country saw not only political stability but also impressive economic growth. The general gave the country its second constitution, established a system of local government that brought people closer to those who governed, and established a system of economic decision-making that eschewed personal whims in favour of conformity with well-articulated strategies. For several years, in economic circles as well as among political scientists, Pakistan was considered a model of success. But the success proved to be short-lived.
Ayub Khan’s model collapsed for one important reason that also explained the failure of subsequent attempts to bring political and economic development to the country. Ayub Khan’s model was based on the faulty assumption that since the leader is all-knowing he can afford to keep the people at bay. His system of basic democracies enfranchised people at the local level, gave them some say in using public money for meeting their needs. But that is as far as their participation in the affairs of the state went. That was not far enough. People rebelled with two consequences: the separation of East Pakistan and the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the first elected ruler of the country.
But Pakistan’s leaders have never missed the opportunity to miss an opportunity. Bhutto had the popular support to give the country a durable political structure and to place the economy on the trajectory of long-term growth. After some initial success, he failed on both counts. His success was in giving the country a constitution that had the support of the people. The political failure was once again the consequence of the belief in an all-knowing patriarch guiding the affairs of the state without much participation from other representatives of the people.
The economic failure was the result of a strong belief in a discredited theory of management: that the best way of delivering benefits of growth to less privileged segments of society was to put the state on the commanding heights of the economy. There was much dissatisfaction among the people with Bhutto’s economic and political management which once again provided space for the military to occupy.
Another 11 years of military rule followed, by far the most destructive period in Pakistan’s history. Ziaul Haq went on to destroy the few political and economic institutions the country was left with. He disfigured the constitution to establish an all-powerful presidency within a parliamentary framework. The inherent tension in this approach could not be reconciled. The most ill-advised move by the religiously inclined military leader was to impose on the country a version of Islam that was foreign to it. His move in that direction, unfortunately, had the support of the United States which wanted jihadis for its mission to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.
The jihadis succeeded and Zia was briefly hailed in the West as the great liberator. But he left an ugly legacy for which the entire world, not only Pakistan, is paying a very heavy price. To understand how this legacy is manifesting itself, we need not go beyond what is happening in Swat today. That is the legacy that current civilian rulers of Pakistan – and now President Barack Obama and his special emissary – must contend with.
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