Drones and Diplomacy

DURING his presidential campaign, Barack Obama repeatedly warned that his administration would take out “high-value terrorist targets” if Pakistan did not act first. Presumably, although he did not make this clear, the area Obama had in mind was Fata; however, he did emphasise the strikes would be against ‘high-value’, ‘important’ or ‘key’ figures of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Three days into Obama’s presidency, we have the first evidence of how his promise will translate into action. Drone attacks in South and North Waziristan have killed at least 14 people, including what the media now routinely refers to as ‘foreign militants’. The New York Times, however, has reported that “American officials in Washington said there were no immediate signs that the strikes on Friday had killed any senior Qaeda leaders.” Shortly after the strikes, President Obama convened his first National Security Council meeting on Pakistan and Afghanistan and over the next few days he is expected to review President Bush’s counter-terrorism measures in the region, including the authorisation of unilateral American special forces raids inside Pakistan. At the moment, the signs emanating from Washington all point towards the adoption of a tougher line on Pakistan’s contribution to the fight against militancy and terrorism.

How does the military facet of Obama’s policy towards Pakistan fit in with the diplomatic facet, which Obama has entrusted to the high-profile Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke? An early assessment suggests the following: military action will continue in Fata while the US waits to see if Pakistan ‘does more’; aid to the Pakistan armed forces will gradually be tied to concrete results against militants; development aid and other financial contributions will initially be stepped up, with further increases dangled as a ‘reward’ for genuine gains against militants in Fata; and behind-the-scenes diplomatic manoeuvring will occur to see what can be brought on the table for debate on improvement in Pak-India relations.

What isn’t clear is how the Pakistani security establishment will react to all of this. It isn’t hard to see how the Pakistan Army may view Obama’s plans as mere window dressing of the Bush policy of dangling the occasional carrot while mostly relying on the stick. Since August, of the 38 drone strikes in Pakistan that have killed nearly 150 people an overwhelmingly number have occurred in South and North Waziristan. The militants have responded by killing dozens of alleged US spies in the area. However, the Pakistan Army has remained focused on the northern tip of Fata — Bajaur, Khyber and Mohmand — and shown little interest in mounting fresh operations in the southern end, where the Waziristan agencies are located. Such differences do not bode well for diplomacy trumping the military option.